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ON GO¨DEL’S SECOND INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM
Thomas Jech
Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem states that no sufficiently strong consistent
mathematical theory can prove its own consistency. In [1] this is proved for every axiomatic
theory extending the Peano Arithmetic. For axiomatic set theory a simpler proof was given
in [2] using the fact that in set theory, consistency of a set of axioms is equivalent to the
existence of a model.
In this note we give a very simple proof of Go¨del’s Theorem for set theory:
Theorem. It is unprovable in set theory (unless it is inconsistent) that there exists a
model of set theory.
By “set theory” we mean any axiomatic set theory with finitely many axioms. The
proof (suitably modified) works for any theory sufficiently strong to formulate the concepts
“model”, “satisfies” and “isomorphic”, such as second order arithmetic and its weaker
versions.
If M and N are models of set theory (henceforth models), we define
M < N if there exists some M ′ ∈ N isomorhic to M.
If M < N and if M ′ ∈ N is isomorphic to M then for every sentence σ,
(1) M |= σ if and only if N |= (M ′ |= σ).
It follows that
(2) if M1 < M2 and M2 < M3 then M1 < M3.
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Let us consider some fixed coding of formulas by numbers (Go¨del numbering), and let
Sn be the name for the nth definable set of numbers.
Definition. S is the set of all numbers n with the property that for every model M
there is a model N < M such that N |= n /∈ Sn.
Let k be the Go¨del number of S. The following sentence is provable in set theory:
k ∈ Sk ↔ ∀M ∃N < M N |= (k /∈ Sk).
Therefore (by (1) and (2)), if M is any model then
(3) M |= (k ∈ Sk) ↔ ∀M1 < M ∃M2 < M1M2 |= (k /∈ Sk).
We shall now assume that it is provable that there is a model, and prove a contradiction.
As a consequence of the assumption, we have not only
(4) there exists a model
but also (using (1))
(5) for every model M there exists a model N < M.
Toward a contradiction, we assume first that k ∈ S. Let M1 be an arbitrary model (by
(4)); there exists an M2 < M1 that satisfies k /∈ Sk. By (3) there exists an M3 < M2 such
that for every M4 < M3, M4 |= k ∈ Sk. Therefore k /∈ S, a contradiction.
Thus assume that k /∈ S. There is an M1 such that for every M2 < M1, M2 |= k ∈ Sk.
Let M2 be an arbitrary model < M1 (it exists by (5)). As M2 |= k ∈ Sk, we have (by (3))
∀M3 < M2 ∃M4 < M3M4 |= (k /∈ Sk).
Let M3 < M2 (by (5)) and let M4 < M3 be such that M4 |= k /∈ Sk. As M4 < M1 (by
(2)), we have a contradiction.
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